When I was asked to formulate some questions or remarks about Prof. Barry’s paper, it was probably assumed that I would not confine myself to the expression of pure agreement. And yet, that is what I am inclined at first to do. I do agree that the view he criticizes is wrong for the reasons he mentions. And I admire the clarity and vigour of his arguments. However the reasons one has for agreeing with a thesis may belong to a (...) context that is very different from the context the thesis itself belongs to. Prof. Barry’s paper can be read at one level as the defence of a certain policy — it contains political recommendations. It is at that level that I entirely agree with it. But his recommendations are probably part of a theoretical outlook I do not share.The question I would like to deal with is: “How should the position which is the target of Brian Barry’s criticism be characterized?” One could say that it is anti-liberal. It is certainly opposed to the liberalism Brian Barry advocates. But there are, I think, also good reasons for characterizing it as a kind of liberalism. It is a sort of excessive, perverse, loony liberalism, but liberalism nevertheless. For the sake of convenience I call it quasi-liberalism. (shrink)

I thought it useful, in responding to the paper written by J.A. Selling, to look at the relation between fundamental and applied ethics and between faith, ethics and science. Not so much because I do not share his opinion — I agree with the content of his paper — nor to limit the reflection to the general ethical foundation, but because the meaning and range of the term ‘Christian ethics’, as it relates to applied ethics, is anything but evident. This (...) is particularly true for ethical judgments within those social sectors where religion no longer plays a commonly accepted role as a public source of legitimation. Does not the communis opinio hold that religious traditions have nothing to contribute to ethics, and certainly to applied ethics, that cannot be known and confirmed from human reason? Therefore, within a pluralistic society, reference to religious arguments in ethical reflection seems more hindersome than helpful when we seek a pragmatic consensus on rational, nonconfessional grounds, and strive towards a common value judgment on matters where religions are not competent.I believe that there are many positive arguments to support this communis opinio. I expect they will be used in our further discussion. When I continue to plead for a countercultural link between the Christian worldview and applied ethics, I do so to clarify the meaning of our position as a Centre. I believe that we must avoid understanding our position only as a sociological or political arrangement. We would do better to wonder whether there is any inherent link between Christianity and applied ethics, and if so, where this link lies. If there is no link, our function is reduced to a sociopolitical arrangement, which I personally would find regrettable. (shrink)

Debt reduction for the poorest countries of the world has become a self-evident goal for all people who feel concerned about the problems of the Third World, about absolute poverty and misery. Also, right-minded people think it is a primary ethical requirement that rich countries and powerful financial institutions should loosen the constraints imposed upon the weakest regions of the world. However, a closer look reveals that this is not just a technical matter, but that this issue is ridden with (...) hard choices and difficult ethical dilemmas. Giving and helping are much more delicate matters than a naïve and benevolent observer might think. A contribution touching upon the ethical background of the debate about debt reduction is a good opportunity to tackle these sorts of problems.Ethics has become fashionable nowadays. Paradoxically, the more people are convinced that self-interest is the main motivating force for the rich and the poor, and the more they think that powerful interest groups are ruling the world, the greater the attraction and the authority of ethical arguments. At the same time ethics has become a rather vague point of reference, supposed to encompass all kinds of benevolent drives, neglecting the evidence that beneficence does not always yield good results. So we shall start with some very general remarks about the nature of ethics, with a reminder of the specificity of ethical arguments for helping the poor and with an analysis of some difficulties in reaching this objective. In the second part of this text, we tackle the more concrete ethical dilemmas related to the issue of debt reduction. (shrink)

In the field of the social sciences, there exists an old and ongoing debate, circling around the question if social scientists should be concerned with the study of society, or rather with the search for the good society. Should they limit their role to the value neutral observation of social phenomena, or should they allow themselves to become fully involved in the quest for the normative conditions of the best possible society? And should they pursue the project of building a (...) grand theory, or rather agree to become practical, moving into the tricky areas of social work, moral education and politics?Today we will not try to solve this old dispute. I only want to refer to it because today’s speaker, Professor Robert Bellah, is a clear proponent of the second alternative, of understanding social science as a moral inquiry. Sociology, in his understanding is a moral science, as it implies a practical exercise: it provides a critical observation and reflection on the structural and cultural conditions of the concrete societal projects we are engaged in as members and citizens. How can our society become and remain independent? How can it be just and fair to all its members? How can it remain innovative and democratic, true to its traditions and open to newcomers?These are core issues of sociology as a moral and humanistic discipline. In trying to answer those questions, we are standing in a long tradition, reaching back to Aristotle, including the classics of modern times, Machiavelli and Hobbes, Marx and Tocqueville, as well as the founding fathers of contemporary sociology, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a great deal of activity and discussion on the appropriate treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers. The increasing number of asylum-seekers in Western Europe, which peaked in Germany with more than 438,000 requests in 1992 alone, has been at the root of the political debate. The administrations involved seem to be unable to cope adequately with such increases, a fact which in its turn has given rise to a variety of humanitarian and juridical problems .It (...) is not my intention here to discuss the many technical facets of this social issue . I prefer, rather, to offer a socio-ethical reflection on one particular and fundamental aspect of our attitude toward refugees, namely, the apparently unavoidable fact that they are set against the background issues of migration and social integration. In their host countries refugees have in fact been perceived primarily as immigrants and foreigners, not as refugees.It is also not my intention to make an a priori judgment on the question. Instead, I would like to begin by inquiring into the historical and structural factors which have defined our perception of the issue. It will become clear that we can only achieve an ethically adequate treatment of refugees if we are prepared to rectify the much broader problem of our attitude to foreigners as such. (shrink)